Results for 'Charles Kedric Fink'

965 found
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  1. Consciousness as Presence: An Exploration of the Illusion of Self.Charles Kedric Fink - 2013 - Buddhist Studies Review 30 (1):113-128.
    Buddhism teaches that ‘self’ as a substantial, enduring entity is an illusion. But for self to be an illusion there must be something in our experience that is misinterpreted as self. What is this? The notion of an experiential self plays an important role in phenomenological investigations of conscious experience. Does the illusion of self consist in mistaking a purely experiential self for a substantial self? I argue against this and locate the source of the illusion in time-consciousness. It is (...)
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  2. Acting with Good Intentions: Virtue Ethics and the Principle that Ought Implies Can.Charles K. Fink - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Research 45:79-95.
    In Morals from Motives, Michael Slote proposed an agent-based approach to virtue ethics in which the morality of an action derives solely from the agent’s motives. Among the many objections that have been raised against Slote’s account, this article addresses two problems associated with the Kantian principle that ought implies can. These are the problems of “deficient” and “inferior” motivation. These problems arise because people cannot freely choose their motives. We cannot always choose to act from good motives; nor can (...)
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  3. The Cultivation of Virtue in Buddhist Ethics.Charles K. Fink - 2013 - Journal of Buddhist Ethics 20:667-701.
    One question pursued in Buddhist studies concerns the classification of Buddhist ethics. Damien Keown has argued that Aristotelian virtue ethics provides a useful framework for understanding Buddhist ethics, but recently other scholars have argued that character consequentialism is more suitable for this task. Although there are similarities between the two accounts, there are also important differences. In this paper, I follow Keown in defending the aretaic interpretative model, although I do not press the analogy with Aristotelian ethics. Rather, I argue (...)
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  4. Animal Experimentation and the Argument from Limited Resources.Charles K. Fink - 1991 - Between the Species 7 (2):90-95.
    Animal rights activists are often accused of caring more about animals than about human beings. How, it is asked, can activists condemn the use of animals in biomedical research—research that improves human health and saves human lives? In this article, I argue that even if animal experimentation might eventually provide cures for many serious diseases, given the present state of the world, we are not justified supporting this research; rather, we ought to devote our limited resources to other forms of (...)
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  5. Buddhism, Punishment, and Reconciliation.Charles K. Fink - 2012 - Journal of Buddhist Ethics 19:369-395.
    One important foundation of Buddhist ethics is a commitment to nonviolence. My aim in this paper is to work out the implications of this commitment with regard to the treatment of offenders. Given that punishment involves the intentional infliction of harm, I argue that the practice of punishment is incompatible with the principle of nonviolence. The core moral teaching of the Buddha is to conquer evil with goodness, and it is reconciliation, rather than punishment, that conforms to this teaching. I (...)
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  6. The Moderate Veiw on Animal Ethics.Charles K. Fink - 1991 - Between the Species: A Journal of Ethics 7 (4):194-200.
    Animal rights advocates reject the use of animals for commercial or scientific purposes. According to some, who are often branded as extremists, it would be wrong to kill or otherwise harm animals even if this were necessary for human health or survival. This, of course, contrasts sharply with the predominate attitude that animals are mere resources for human use and consumption. In this paper, I explore a view on animal ethics that is intermediate between these two extremes. According to this (...)
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  7. How many stripes are on the tiger in my dreams?Sascha Benjamin Fink - manuscript
    There is tension between commonly held views concerning phenomenal imagery on the one hand and our first-person epistemic access to it on the other. This tension is evident in many individual issues and experiments in philosophy and psychology (e.g. inattentional and change blindness, the speckled hen, dream coloration, visual periphery). To dissolve it, we can give up either (i) that we lack full introspective access to the phenomenal properties of our imagistic experiences, or (ii) that phenomenal imagery is fully determined, (...)
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  8. A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'.Julian Fink - 2014 - Erkenntnis (4):909-941.
    The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have a non-maximal degree (...)
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  9. A Deeper Look at the "Neural Correlate of Consciousness".Sascha Benjamin Fink - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    A main goal of the neuroscience of consciousness is: find the neural correlate to conscious experiences (NCC). When have we achieved this goal? The answer depends on our operationalization of “NCC.” Chalmers (2000) shaped the widely accepted operationalization according to which an NCC is a neural system with a state which is minimally sufficient (but not necessary) for an experience. A deeper look at this operationalization reveals why it might be unsatisfactory: (i) it is not an operationalization of a correlate (...)
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  10. The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires?Julian Fink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):117-140.
    Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’ – at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by (...)
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  11. Pain: A Natural State without a Nature? Dealing with the Ambiguity of „Pain“ in Science and Ethics.S. Benjamin Fink - 2010 - In Heather McKenzie, John Quintner & Gillian Bendelow (eds.), At the Edge of Being: The Aporia of Pain. Inter-Disciplinary Press.
    Can we find necessary and sufficient conditions for a mental state to be a pain state? That is, does pain have a nature? Or is the term ‘pain’ ambiguous? I argue here that our expression ‘pain’ lacks necessary use conditions if one considers a range of contexts. As use conditions constrain the reference class, I argue that ‘pain’ does not refer to a natural category, but binds together a bunch of loosely resembling phenomena. This leads to problems for scientific and (...)
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  12. Are there process-requirements of rationality?Julian Fink - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (4):475-488.
    Does a coherentist version of rationality issue requirements on states? Or does it issue requirements on processes? This paper evalu- ates the possibility of process-requirements. It argues that there are two possible definitions of state- and process-requirements: a satisfaction- based definition and a content-based definition. I demonstrate that the satisfaction-based definition is inappropriate. It does not allow us to uphold a clear-cut distinction between state- and process-requirements. We should therefore use a content-based definition of state- and pro- cess-requirements. However, a (...)
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  13. Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational Consistency.Julian Fink - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):109-130.
    Suppose rationality requires you to A if you believe you ought to A. Suppose you believe that you ought to A. How can you satisfy this requirement? One way seems obvious. You can satisfy this requirement by A-ing. But can you also satisfy it by stopping to believe that you ought to A? Recently, it has been argued that this second option is not a genuine way of satisfying the above requirement. Conditional requirements of rationality do not have two ‘symmetric’, (...)
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  14. What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning?Julian Fink - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (4):471-482.
    This paper argues that practical reasoning is a mental process which leads a person from a set of existent mental states to an intention. In Section 1, I defend this view against two other proposals according to which practical reasoning either concludes in an action itself or in a normative belief. Section 2 discusses the correctness of practical reasoning and explains how the correctness of instrumental reasoning can be explained by the logical relations that hold between the contents of the (...)
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  15. Independence and Connections of Pain and Suffering.S. Benjamin Fink - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):46-66.
    Is a phenomenal pain a conscious primitive or composed of more primitive phenomenal states? Are pain experiences necessarily or only contingently unpleasant? Here, I sketch how to answer such questions concerning intra-phenomenal metaphysics using the example of pain and unpleasantness. Arguments for a symmetrical metaphysical independence of phenomenal pain and unpleasant affect are presented, rejecting a composite view like the IASP definition and dimensional views. The motivating intuition of these views is explained by common binding mechanisms in consciousness and characterized (...)
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  16. The Function of Normative Process-Requirements.Julian Fink - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):115-136.
    This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process-requirements upon us. It has been argued that process-requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process-requirements. First, process-requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree (...)
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  17. Is the right prior to the good?Julian Fink - 2007 - South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):143-149.
    One popular line of argument put forward in support of the principle that the right is prior to the good is to show that teleological theories, which put the good prior to the right, lead to implausible normative results. There are situa- tions, it is argued, in which putting the good prior to the right entails that we ought to do things that cannot be right for us to do. Consequently, goodness cannot (always) explain an action's rightness. This indicates that (...)
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  18. Editorial.Julian Fink - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):422-424.
    Within the debate concerning reason and rationality, instrumental incoherence was for a long time conceived of as the paradigm of irrationality. However, with the emergence of the so-called ‘bootstrapping objection’ and the debate concerning the ‘scope’ of rational requirements, the innocuous status of the normative significance of (instrumental) coherence became subject to. This led to a paradigmatic shift in how to understand the relationship between rational requirements and normativity. While there now exists considerable doubt that rational requirements are normative, it (...)
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  19. Progress by Paradox: Paradoxien als Katalysator wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts.Sascha Benjamin Fink - 2017 - In Karsten Engel (ed.), Von Schildkröten und Lügnern. Paderborn, Deutschland:
    Unter einigenWissenschaftlern ist die Vorstellung verbreitet, dass Paradoxien Anzeichen von Fortschritt sein können. Es ist jedoch unklar, wie dies zu deuten ist. Dieser Essay stellt ein subjekt-relatives Verständnis von Paradoxikalität vor, das Paradoxien als »Dissonanzen der Zustimmung« (Rescher 2001) charakterisiert und dadurch erlaubt, sie als Katalysator wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts zu rekonstruieren: Durch ihre Struktur haben Problemstellungen in Form von Paradoxien wenigstens fünf fortschrittsfördernde Eigenschaften, die sie Problemstellungen in Form von Fragen voraushaben. Dadurch können Paradoxien als Angelpunkte theoretischen Fortschritts gesehen werden. Dies (...)
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  20. The Morality of Price/Quality and Ethical Consumerism.Julian Fink & Daniel Schubert - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (3):425-438.
    Hussain claims that ethical consumers are subject to democratic requirements of morality, whereas ordinary price/quality consumers are exempt from these requirements. In this paper, we demonstrate that Hussain’s position is incoherent, does not follow from the arguments he offers for it, and entails a number of counterintuitive consequences.
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  21. What (in)coherence is not.Julian Fink - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):125-134.
    Two or more attitudinal states are incoherent if and only if, necessarily, under conditions of full transparency, you are disposed to give up one of them. This is roughly the account of incoherence that has recently been put forward by Alex Worsnip (2018). In this paper, I argue that Worsnip’s account of incoherence is incorrect. Not only does it fail to be fully general (i.e., it does not allow us to assess the coherence of all combinations of attitudes), but it (...)
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  22. The Ambiguity of "Pain".S. Benjamin Fink - 2010 - In Jane Fernandez-Goldborough (ed.), Making Sense of: Pain. Inter-disciplinary Net.
    I argue that the understanding of "pain" as presented in the official medical definition by the IASP is ambiguous and likely a cluster concept.
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  23.  36
    Are all Actions Movements of the Agent's Body?Julian Fink - 2011 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 1 (24):52-64.
    Davidson famously contended that all actions are movements of the agent's body. It has been objected, however, that Davidson's view is incompatible with his own definition of primitive actions. This paper argues that this objection is based on an incorrect reading of Davidson's argument. I will show that by reading "movements", in "all actions are bodily movements", transitively, Davidson's definition of primitive actions ceases to conflict with his thesis that all actions are bodily movements.
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  24. The Ladder of Rationality: John Broome: Rationality Through Reasoning Oxford, Wiley Blackwell, 2013, ISBN 978-1-4051-1710-4, 308 pages, £24.99/€31.30.Julian Fink - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):787-791.
    This paper is a review and critical discussion of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning. In particular, it engages critically with Broome’s view on the independence of normative reasons and rationality, his construal of the capacity, property, and requirement senses of “rationality”, and his account of reasoning as a conscious, rule-following operation on mental contents.
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  25. Erratum to: The Ladder of Rationality: John Broome: Rationality Through Reasoning Oxford, Wiley Blackwell, 2013, ISBN 978-1-4051-1710-4, 308 pages, £24.99/€31.30.Julian Fink - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):793.
    This paper is a review and critical discussion of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning. In particular, it engages critically with Broome’s view on the independence of normative reasons and rationality, his construal of the capacity, property, and requirement senses of “rationality”, and his account of reasoning as a conscious, rule-following operation on mental contents.
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  26. Die Rationalität eingefrorener Konflikte.Julian Fink - 2018 - Spektrum 2018 (2).
    Der Arktikel beschreibt die Logik des "eingefrorenen" Konflikts zwischen der Republik Moldau und der selbsternannten „Pridnestrowische Moldauischen Republik“ ("Transnistrien"). Bezugnehmend auf die strategischen Optionen der beteiligten Akteure wird erklärt warum der seit 1992 bestehende Konflikt zu keiner Lösung findet.
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  27. Sir John F. W. Herschel and Charles Darwin: Nineteenth-Century Science and Its Methodology.Charles H. Pence - 2018 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (1):108-140.
    There are a bewildering variety of claims connecting Darwin to nineteenth-century philosophy of science—including to Herschel, Whewell, Lyell, German Romanticism, Comte, and others. I argue here that Herschel’s influence on Darwin is undeniable. The form of this influence, however, is often misunderstood. Darwin was not merely taking the concept of “analogy” from Herschel, nor was he combining such an analogy with a consilience as argued for by Whewell. On the contrary, Darwin’s Origin is written in precisely the manner that one (...)
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  28. Structuralism in the Science of Consciousness: Editorial Introduction.Andrew Y. Lee & Sascha Benjamin Fink - manuscript
    In recent years, the science and the philosophy of consciousness has seen growing interest in structural questions about consciousness. This is the Editorial Introduction for a special volume for Philosophy and the Mind Sciences on “Structuralism in Consciousness Studies.”.
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  29. On Hannah Arendt’s Aestheticism.Charles Blattberg - 2024 - Res Philosophica 101 (3):479-504.
    Hannah Arendt’s politics is aesthetic rather than practical, motivated by enjoyment rather than well-being, and so it should be rejected. I begin with an account of aestheticism as the doctrine according to which seemingly non-aesthetic things are actually aesthetic, parts of a whole dimension of reality that we might simply call “the aesthetic.” We access it by taking a disinterested attitude, one that affirms things for their own sakes, and there are four ways of doing this: disinterested appreciating (e.g., of (...)
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  30. The Honor-Based Society, Past and Present.Charles Herrman - 2023 - Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture 7 (1):81-102.
    This paper asserts that honor-based peoples have and maintain a distinct cultural identity that is valid for at least eighty-five percent of the world population. It is necessarily considered relative to dignity-based societies which make up the other fifteen percent. Practically all dignity-based cultures originated during the Enlightenment; modern honor-based groups will oftentimes through diffusion manifest some dignity-based traits or observe fewer of the traditional honor-based features. This paper will survey both traditional and modern forms of the honor-based culture.
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  31. Meditations on Western Philosophy.Charles Bakker - manuscript
    In this paper I shall explain how I came to realize that for as long as I believed that there exists an epistemic gap, or veil of perception, separating the world into that which is subjective and internal to the mind from that which is objective and external to the mind, I was unable to provide a compelling argument for the existence of this same Epistemic Gap ontology.
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  32. Whatever Happened to Reversion?Charles H. Pence - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92 (C):97-108.
    The idea of ‘reversion’ or ‘atavism’ has a peculiar history. For many authors in the latenineteenth and early-twentieth centuries – including Darwin, Galton, Pearson, Weismann, and Spencer, among others – reversion was one of the central phenomena which a theory of heredity ought to explain. By only a few decades later, however, Fisher and others could look back upon reversion as a historical curiosity, a non-problem, or even an impediment to clear theorizing. I explore various reasons that reversion might have (...)
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  33. Induction, Induction, Goose!Charles Bakker - manuscript
    In this paper I raise concerns that I have with what I perceive to be as a complete lack of warrant for Hume’s assertion that there are only two types of reasoning – demonstrative and probable. (Hume’s fork) What I leave for others to decide is whether this lack of warrant therefore successfully undercuts Hume’s argument for the Problem of Induction.
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  34. Antisemitism and the Aesthetic.Charles Blattberg - 2021 - Philosophical Forum 52 (3):189-210.
    Antisemitism is fun. This essay explains why and proposes a new approach to combating it.
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  35. Does perceptual psychology rule out disjunctivism in the theory of perception?Charles Goldhaber - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7025-7047.
    Disjunctivist views in the theory of perception hold that genuine perceptions differ in some relevant kind from misperceptions, such as illusions and hallucinations. In recent papers, Tyler Burge has argued that such views conflict with the basic tenets of perceptual psychology. According to him, perceptual psychology is committed to the view that genuine perceptions and misperceptions produced by the same proximal stimuli must be or involve perceptual states of the same kind. This, he argues, conflicts with disjunctivism. In this paper, (...)
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  36. Block on Attribution, Discrimination, and Adaptation.Susanna Schellenberg, Andrew Fink, Carl Schoonover & Mary A. Peterson - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  37. El contrato racial (español).Charles Mills (ed.) - 1997 - Cornell University Press.
    The Racial Contract pone la teoría clásica del contrato social occidental, sin ambages, al servicio de un uso radical extraordinario. Con una mirada arrolladora sobre el expansionismo y el racismo europeos de los últimos quinientos años, Charles W. Mills demuestra cómo este peculiar y no reconocido "contrato" ha dado forma a un sistema de dominación europea global: cómo da lugar a la existencia de "blancos" y "no blancos", personas de pleno derecho y subpersonas, cómo influye en la teoría moral (...)
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  38. Hume's Real Riches.Charles Goldhaber - 2022 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 39 (1):45–57.
    Hume describes his own “open, social, and cheerful humour” as “a turn of mind which it is more happy to possess, than to be born to an estate of ten thousand a year.” Why does he value a cheerful character so highly? I argue that, for Hume, cheerfulness has two aspects—one manifests as mirth in social situations, and the other as steadfastness against life’s misfortunes. This second aspect is of special interest to Hume in that it safeguards the other virtues. (...)
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  39. (1 other version)Can we read minds by imaging brains?Charles Rathkopf - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 10:1-25.
    Will brain imaging technology soon enable neuroscientists to read minds? We cannot answer this question without some understanding of the state of the art in neuroimaging. But neither can we answer this question without some understanding of the concept invoked by the term "mind reading." This article is an attempt to develop such understanding. Our analysis proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, we provide a categorical explication of mind reading. The categorical explication articulates empirical conditions that must be (...)
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  40. Origin’s Chapter IX and X: From Old Objections to Novel Explanations: Darwin on the Fossil Record.Charles H. Pence - 2023 - In Maria Elice Brzezinski Prestes (ed.), Understanding Evolution in Darwin's “Origin”: The Emerging Context of Evolutionary Thinking. Springer. pp. 321-331.
    The ninth and tenth chapters of the Origin mark a profound, if perhaps difficult to detect, shift in the book’s argumentative structure. In the previous few chapters and in the ninth, Darwin has been exploring a variety of objections to natural selection, some more obvious (where are all the fossils of transitional forms?) and some showing careful attention to challenging consequences of evolution (could selection really produce instincts?). Starting in the tenth, however, Darwin turns to showing us what kinds of (...)
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  41. A New Foundation for the Propensity Interpretation of Fitness.Charles H. Pence & Grant Ramsey - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):851-881.
    The propensity interpretation of fitness (PIF) is commonly taken to be subject to a set of simple counterexamples. We argue that three of the most important of these are not counterexamples to the PIF itself, but only to the traditional mathematical model of this propensity: fitness as expected number of offspring. They fail to demonstrate that a new mathematical model of the PIF could not succeed where this older model fails. We then propose a new formalization of the PIF that (...)
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  42. Not Without a Doubt.Charles Bakker - manuscript
    In this paper, I share my story about some of my experiences with doubt. Along the way, I also share some philosophical reflections. I know this does not tell you very much, but like I said, I am telling a story, and I do not want to spoil the ending.
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  43. Gaps: When Not Even Nothing Is There.Charles Blattberg - 2021 - Comparative Philosophy 12 (1):31-55.
    A paradox, it is claimed, is a radical form of contradiction, one that produces gaps in meaning. In order to approach this idea, two senses of “separation” are distinguished: separation by something and separation by nothing. The latter does not refer to nothing in an ordinary sense, however, since in that sense what’s intended is actually less than nothing. Numerous ordinary nothings in philosophy as well as in other fields are surveyed so as to clarify the contrast. Then follows the (...)
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  44. Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts: Das Rechtsdenken im Nationalsozialismus in Originaltexten.Herlinde Pauer-Studer & Julian Fink (eds.) - 2014 - Suhrkamp.
    Auf welchen normativen Grundlagen beruhte das NS-System? Mit welcher Rechtfertigung konnte der Führerwille dort zu einer Quelle des Rechts werden? Wie war es gemäß der NS-Strafgesetzgebung möglich, Handlungen zu bestrafen, die gegen kein geschriebenes Gesetz verstießen? Die in diesem Band versammelten und kommentierten Originaltexte geben Einblick in das Denken von Rechtstheoretikern, die mit dem Nationalsozialismus sympathisierten, und belegen deren Versuch, autoritäre und dem Rechtsstaat widersprechende Rechtsprinzipien zu legitimieren. Dabei zeigt sich ein überraschender und bis jetzt von der rechts- und moralphilosophischen (...)
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  45. Humour in Nietzsche's style.Charles Boddicker - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):447-458.
    Nietzsche's writing style is designed to elicit affective responses in his readers. Humour is one of the most common means by which he attempts to engage his readers' affects. In this article, I explain how and why Nietzsche uses humour to achieve his philosophical ends. The article has three parts. In part 1, I reject interpretations of Nietzsche's humour on which he engages in self‐parody in order to mitigate the charge of decadence or dogmatism by undermining his own philosophical authority. (...)
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  46. Kierkegaard’s Deep Diversity: The One and the Many.Charles Blattberg - 2020 - In Mélissa Fox-Muraton (ed.), Kierkegaard and Issues in Contemporary Ethics. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 51-68.
    Kierkegaard’s ideal supports a radical form of “deep diversity,” to use Charles Taylor’s expression. It is radical because it embraces not only irreducible conceptions of the good but also incompatible ones. This is due to its paradoxical nature, which arises from its affirmation of both monism and pluralism, the One and the Many, together. It does so in at least three ways. First, in terms of the structure of the self, Kierkegaard describes his ideal as both unified (the “positive (...)
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  47. "But What Are You Really?": The Metaphysics of Race.Charles W. Mills - 1998 - In Charles Mills (ed.), Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race. Cornell University Press. pp. 41-66.
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  48. Indledning.Jens Kristian Larsen & Jakob Leth Fink - 2015 - In Jakob Leth Fink & Jens Kristian Larsen (eds.), Platon - Værk og Virkning. Gyldendal. pp. 13-38.
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  49. The Realm of Reason. [REVIEW]Julian Fink - 2005 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 8.
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  50. Applying the concept of pain.Charles Sayward - 2003 - Iyyun 52 (July):290-300.
    This paper reaches the conclusion that, while there are ordinary cases in which the pretending possibility is reasonable, these cases always contain some element that makes it reasonable. This will be the element we ask for when we ask why pretending possibility is raised. Knowledge that someone else is in pain is a matter of eliminating the proposed element or neutralizing its pain-negating aspect.
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